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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIRECT IMPORT BUYERS' ASSO-
CIATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
K.S.L., INC, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for libel and slander. The plaintiff 
brought the action against the defendant after defendant 
aired, on television and radio, certain statements which 
plaintiff claims were false, misleading, and detrimental 
to plaintiffs sales program and business reputation. Plain-
tiff further claims that the defendant's agent and em-
ployee, Lynn Packer^  knew of the falsity of the state-
ments when made and published, and failed to use rea-
OaseNo. 
13966 
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sonable care to ascertain the accuracy of other statements 
published by the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Prior to the completion of discovery, defendant 
moved for a summary judgment. From a judgment grant-
ing defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plain-
tiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to reverse the summary judgment and 
have the case remanded to the district court for trial on 
the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff alleges that Lynn Packer, the defendant's 
employee, caused to be broadcast over television and 
radio certain untrue statements regarding a product sold 
by the plaintiff known as Ecomo-Jets or Eoono-Needle. 
The plaintiff's action is based upon the common law cause 
of action of libel and slander and on Section 45-2-7, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
The defendant denies that any defamatory state-
ments were uttered or published by the defendant's agent 
and employee, Lynn Packer, and claims that any state-
ment uttered or published by Lynn Packer was true and 
correct. 
After the plaintiff's complaint and defendant's an-
swer had been filed, the defendant submitted two sets 
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of brief interrogatories to the plaintiff and answers to the 
interrogatories were filed. Thereafter the plaintiff took 
the deposition of Mr. Lynn Packer who was the news 
reporter publishing the statements complained of by the 
plaintiff. During the deposition Mr. Packer was asked 
to state the name of a "local Salt Lake executive" who 
stated that the plaintiff's product was a "waste of money," 
and Mr. Packer refused to divulge the information and 
claimed the constitutional privilege of the First Amend-
ment for his refusal to disclose the source of his informa-
tion. Plaintiff thereafter brought a motion to compel the 
answer and plaintiff's motion was granted. After the 
order was issued to compel the defendant to reveal the 
source of his information, a second deposition was taken 
of Mr. Packer to establish Mr. Packer's refusal under 
oath. 
The second deposition was delayed because the at-
torneys for defendant K.S.L., Inc., Mr. Ray R. Ohristen-
sen and Mr. W. Clark Burt advised counsel for the plain-
tiff that they were not representing Mr. Packer personally 
and Mr. Packer would need to obtain independent coun-
sel. Plaintiff delayed the second deposition until Mr. 
Packer was able to retain independent counsel to appear 
with him at the second deposition. 
After the second deposition was taken and Mr. 
Packer's refusal established under oath, a motion for an 
order to show cause and an order to show cause was filed 
and served and scheduled for hearing. Prior to the hear-
ing the defendant K.S.L., Inc., through its attorney, Mr. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ray R. Chrisitensen, brought a motion for summary judg-
ment and by stipulation of the parties the order to show 
cause was deferred subject to rescheduling after the mo-
tion for summary judgment. 
The defendant's motion for summary judgment was 
based on its contention that there were no genuine issues 
of fact which would entitle plaintiff to proceed with the 
case to trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
All references to page numbers other than case cita-
tions are references to Mr. Packer's first deposition. 
The Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occasions 
reaffirmed the long established rule that summary judg-
ment could only be granted where the pleadings, evidence, 
admissions, and inferences therefrom viewed most favor-
able to the loser must show that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and that the winner is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law. Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 
13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P. 2d 266 (1962). In Thompson v. 
Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P. 2d 62 (1964), the 
court ruled that the adverse party is entitled to have the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
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from viewed in the light most favorable to him. In Re-
liable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins., Under-
writers, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P. 2d 685 (1965), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that any doubts regarding the 
propriety of summary judgment should be resolved in 
favor of the adverse party. In Singleton v. Alexander, 
19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P. 2d 126, the court ruled thsat the 
weight of testimony submitted by way of deposition and 
affidavit or the credibility of a witness should not be 
considered in a motion for summary judgment, and the 
only question to be determined is whether or not there 
is a dispute as to any material fact and whether or not 
the moving party should prevail as a matter of law. 
Of the various issues raised in defamation suits, the 
court, in Utah Farm Bureau Federation v. National Farm-
ers Union Service Corp., 198 F. 2d 20, ruled that the 
question as to the public nature or concern, fair, privileged, 
malicious, and libelous nature of the statement is usually 
a question for the jury to be decided under all circum-
stances surrounding the case. 
By its complaint the plaintiff alleged that defendant's 
employee and agent, Lynn Packer, uttered untrue state-
ments and published certain untrue statements knowing 
them to be untrue as uttered or published and further 
published or uttered statements, the inferences of which 
would lead the listener or viewer to a false and mislead-
ing condusion because of the omission of other informa-
tion. For example, Mr. Packer quoted Mr. White of New 
Hampshire extensively in his reports. The statements 
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attributed to Mr. White were to the effect that plaintiff's 
products were useless, that the products may be in vio-
lation of antipollution laws because the carburetor jets 
had to be replaced and could cause burned valves in auto-
mobiles. Yet Mr. Packer admits in his deposition that 
he knew Mr. White had not tested these products (page 
11, lines 11-20) and had no evidence as to burned valves 
and knew that the United States Clean Air Act does 
not prohibit per se disturbing a car's existing idle screws 
(page 14, lines 2-5 and 19-25). It is certainly false that 
the United States Clean Air Act or any other antipollu-
tion legislation per se prohibits disturbing the idle screws 
on carburetors or on any other portion of an automobile's 
antipoHution device. It is true that any modification or 
adjustment of an automobile's antipollution system which 
lessens the overall effectiveness of the antipollution system 
is prohibited by law. Mr. Packer was aware of this dis-
tinction at the time of the broadcast of November 14, 
1973, whereby he states: 
"And Dr. Grant Winn of the Utah Air Consearva-
tion Committee said the Eoono-Jets would be 
unlawful if they alter — for the worse — a car's 
air pollution control equipment." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Mr. Packer stated in his broadcast that a "local 
auto executive said he personally thinks such devices are 
a waste of money." This statement was published by Mar. 
Packer notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Packer knew 
before the broadcast that the unidentified auto executive 
did not test the device in question nor did the company 
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for whom such person was working test the device (page 
19, lines 13, 14). Mr. Packer refers to a California gov-
ernment agency in his report and states: 
"In 1971 a California government agency tested 
Econojets and found the units decreased carbon 
monoxide emissions but increased hydro carbon 
and nitrogen oxides emissions." 
In Mr. Packer's affidavit for summary judgment, Mr. 
Packer states he reviewed the California Air Resources 
Board's emission test on Econo-Needle carbon modifica-
tion. He further states in his deposition that he read 
through all of the California Air Resources Board report 
prior to his first broadcast of November 14, 1973 (page 
20, lines 15-16; page 21, lines 14-21). The California Air 
Resources Board of Resolution 71-58, September 15, 1971, 
which is in evidence before the court, and (the specific 
findings of the Air Resources Board indicate that "the 
Econo-Needle device does not reduce the effectiveness 
of any required motor vehicle pollution control device for 
1969-model year and earlier vehicles with engines over 
140 cubic inch displacement and is therefore exempt from 
the prohibitions of Section 27156 of the Vehicle Code." 
The report also indicates that notwithstanding the mathe-
matical calculations reflected on the bottom of page 2 
of their report, the California engineers conducting the 
test concluded that the device "produces less carbon 
monoxide than operation with the standard idle screw. 
The device appears to have little effect on hydrocarbon 
and nitric oxide emissions." 
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Since Mr. Packer admitted that he was aware of the 
full report and had read through the entire report, Mr. 
Packer knew the statements he uttered on tdevision 
and radio could only be construed to mean the plaintiff's 
product was in violation of the California Air Resources 
Board standards when in fact the plaintiff's product had 
passed the California Air Resources Board test and was 
given approval for sale in the state of California, at least 
on 1969 vehicles and earlier models. Mr. Packer's state-
ment regarding the Califorfnia Air Resources Board test 
combined with his other statements of Dr. Grant Winn 
and Mr. A. J. White all lead to a distorted and false con-
clusion that this device was in violation of the laws of 
the state of California and in other states. Furthermore, 
since Mr. Packer admits that he read through all of the 
California Air Resources Board tests, Mr. Packer knew 
that the test itself reflected a reduction in gasoline con-
sumption during the test but neglected to mention this 
particular fact to his audience. 
In Mr. Packer' affidavit for summary judgment, Mr. 
Packer admits having had the benefit of the test result 
from the automotive testing laboratory of Aurora, Colo-
rado, yet Mr. Packer failed to mention in any of his 
broadcasts tha the Aurora, Colorado, tests showed an 
average decrease of 40 percent in carbon monoxide, an 
average decrease of 23 percent in hydrocarbons, and an 
average increase of 5 percent of oxides of nitrogen for 
an overall decrease in engine pollutants. He also failed 
to state that the test indicated there was an average in-
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crease in miles per gallon or a savings to the motorist 
between 5 to 8 percent pursuant to the test. 
Finally, Mr. Packer admits that he had come to the 
conclusion that at least some of the claims being made 
for the product were fraudulent at the time of his first 
broadcast (page 39, lines 3-14). Since the only claim 
made by the plaintiff was that the device could save up 
to 6 miles per gallon in fuel consumption, it must be 
assumed that Mr. Packer concluded that some portion 
of this claim was fraudulent and he therefore intended to 
expose this with public disclosure. 
In fact, Mr. Packer had no substantial information 
upon which to base his opinion or his conclusions that 
the claimed benefits of the product were fraudulent, and 
Mr. Packer relied solely on two sources, both of which 
admittedly had not tested the product. Mr. Packer was 
in fact aware that some of the statements which he 
uttered or published were false or misleading. 
The lower court, at the hearing on plaintiff's motion 
to set aside the summary judgment, advised counsel for 
the plaintiff and the defendant that the court's decision 
was based upon Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 
2997 (1974). The lower court stated that he believed 
that opinion held that the news media is given complete 
immunity in discussing issues of public concern regard-
less of the truth or falsity of the statement and regard-
less of whether the false statements were made know-
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ingly, intentionally, or with complete disregard as to the 
accuracy of the statement. 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, invloved the pub-
lication of certain defamatory statements by a magazine 
publisher. The defendant published certain {statements 
about the plaintiff, a reputable Chicago attorney, and 
claimed the privilege and immunity on the basis that the 
First Amendment protected publishers against defama-
tion suits when the articles involved matters of general 
public interest or persons who could be considered public 
figures. 
The Court held that the First Amendment does not 
protect a publisher when a private individual is injured 
by defamatory statements notwithstanding the fact that 
the topic of discussion is of public interest. In so hold-
ing, the Court stated: 
". . . there is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact. Neither the intentional He 
nor the careless error materially advances so-
ciety's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open' debate on public issues . . . They belong 
to that category of utterances which 'axe no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are 
of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.' 
• • • 
"The legitimate state interest underlying the law 
of libel is the compensation of individuals for 
the harm inflicted on them by defamatory false-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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hoods. We would not lightly require the State to 
abandon this purpose, for, as Mr. Justice Stewart 
has reminded us, the individual's right to the pro-
tection of his own good name 'reflects no more 
than our basic concept of the essential dignity 
and worth of every human being — a concept at 
the root of any decent system of ordered lib-
erty. The protection of private personality, like 
the protection of life iself, is left primarily to the 
individual states under the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments . . / " 
The Court further holds that the states should retain 
substantial latitude in enforcing the legal remedy for 
defamatory falsehoods injurious to private individuals and 
specifically refuses to extend the First Amendment im-
munity to matters of public interest where the injury 
is to a private individual. 
In granting the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, the lower court was compelled to find as a matter 
of law the following conclusions: 
1. There were no material issues of fact which 
would merit a trial of the case. 
2. The plaintiff is a public person or public 
figure in the nature of a political candidate. 
3. All of the statements made by Lynn Packer 
were true* 
4. If the statements made by Lynn Packer 
were false, he made a reasonable and dili-
gent search for the truth and used due care 
in publishing false statements. 
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5. Lynn Packer did not act maliciously in mak-
ing any false statements. 
6. Any utterances or publication by Lynn 
Packer, if false, were privileged. 
All of the issues outlined above, under the Utah 
Farm Bureau Federation case, are issues to be decided 
by the jury together with all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the case. 
Carey v. Hearst Publications, 19 Wash. 2d 655, 143 
P. 2d 857 (1943) sheds considerable light on the question 
of use of reasonable care or diligence in uttering or pub-
lishing statements in the news reporting industry. 
The case involved the reporting of a judicial proceed-
ing and the newspaper reported on certain statements 
made by an attorney who had taken the witness stand 
to testify. In its defense, the newspaper cootended that 
since they relied on reputable news wire service for their 
informaition and since it involved the reporting of a ju-
dicial proceeding, the plaintiff should not prevail because 
of the use of due car and diligence in reporting the news 
and because the reporting of a judicial proceeding was 
privileged. As to the first contention of due care, the 
court stated: 
". . . It is ordinarily held that the publication of 
defamatory matter by a newspaper is not privi-
leged by reason of the fact that it is copied from 
another publication, or comes through the regu-
lar channels of news collection, without any no-
tice of its falsity, and that the newspaper pub-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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lishing it is liable in damages to the person 
libeled,, in the absence of other justification." 
As to the claim of privilege for reporting a judicial 
proceeding, the court stated: 
"Appellants contend that, being the report of a 
judicial proceeding, publication of the story is 
attended by the rule of qualified privilege, and 
that malice must be alleged and proved in order 
to sustain a cause of action. Truth of a story, 
libelous pr se, is a complete defense. If the story 
be false, however, qualified privilege does not 
absolve the publisher even though the charges 
be made in good faith." 
The question of qualified privileges has been ruled 
upon by the Utah Supreme Court in Berry v. 
Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P. 2d 814 (1958). In 
this case a doctor of a patient gave out information 
to another doctor who was inquiring in behalf of the 
girl's family. The lower court held that the doctor had 
a conditional privilege and instructed the jury of the con-
ditional privilege. The lower court also instructed the 
jury that if the statement was true or if the defendant 
had probable cause to believe the statement to be true, 
it would constitute a defense. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that even if circumstances warranted a conditional 
privilege, the conditional privilege could be defeated. In 
so holding, the court stated: 
"We are aware that it is frequently stated that 
where the situation is privileged there is no lia-
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bility in the absence of actual malice. However, 
an examination of the authorities reveals that 
quite generally, when the matter is actually in 
issue, they are in accord upon a principle which 
we consider sound and salutary: that the privi-
lege to pass on derogatory information, which 
proves false, must have been exercised with at 
least reasonable discretion, or the publisher will 
be held responsible therefor . . ." 
The court further cites the Restatement of Torts 
which reads: 
"Even though the occasion is so privileged, a 
particular person cannot avail himself of the 
privilege arising therefrom if he abuses the occa-
sion * * * The occasion may be abused by 
the publisher's lack of belief or reasonable 
grounds for belief in the truth of the defamatory 
matter * * *; by the publication of the de-
famatory matter for some improper purpose 
* * *; by excessive publication * * *; 
or by the publication of defamatory matter not 
reasonably believed to be necessary to accom-
plish the purpose. * * *" 
The court goes further and states: 
It is significant that the privilege we are here 
concerned with is referred to as a 'conditional' 
or 'qualified' privilege. The reason for the lim-
iting adjectives is that it must be exercised with 
certain cautions: (a) it must be done in good 
faith and reasonable care must be exercised as 
to its truth, (b) likewise, the information must 
be reported fairly, (c) only such infonnation 
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should be conveyed, and (d) only to such per-
sons as are necessary to the purpose . . . 
"(a) It seems hardly necessary to state that 
one cannot pass on derogatory information in-
different to its truth, or the consequences there-
of, but failure to exercise reasonable care and 
diligence to ascertain the truth destroys the privi-
lege . . . 
". . . But the privilege is not something which 
arises automotically and becomes absolute 
merely because there is an interest to protect. 
It has its origin in, and it is governed by, the 
rule of good sense and customary conduct of 
people motivated by good will and proper con-
sideration for others . . . The policy of the law 
concerning this matter is framed in the light of 
the hazard that defamation can so easily under-
mine or destroy a most precious possession: a 
good name and reputation. In ancient writ it is 
said 'A good name is rather to be chosen than 
great riches.' Recognizing that a good name is 
so hard to acquire and to preserve, yet so vul-
nerable to being tarnished, the law imposes upon 
one publishing derogatory information, even for 
laudatory purposes, the responsibility of exercis-
ing due care in what he does and in knowing 
whereof he speaks." 
The Berry case referred to above follows closely in 
line with Section 45-2-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended. That section states in part: 
"Nothing in this act contained shall be con-
strued to relieve any person broadcasting over 
a radio or television station from liability under 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the law of libel, slander, or defamation. Nor 
$hall anything in this act be constsrued to relieve 
any person, firm, or corporation owning or oper-
ating a radio or television broadcasting station 
or network from liability under the law of libel, 
slander, or defamation on account of any broad-
cast prepared or made by any such person* firm, 
or corporation . . ." 
In Demrrum v. Star Broadcasting Co., 28 Utah 2d 
50, 497 P. 2d 1378 (1972), the court was involved in 
determining whether or not a radio station could claim 
the privilege under Section 45-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) against a defamatory statement which was made 
by a anonymous caller to the radio station on one of the 
popular two-way radio shows. The case involved the 
plaintiff Demman who was running for a county com-
mission position. The court, in a 3-to-2 decision, held 
that the radio station was protected by a qualified privi-
lege. It is interesting to note, however, that one of the 
judges in the majority decision concurred on the basis 
that the plaintiff had stipulated that certain issues of 
fact be determined by the court rather than by the jury 
and that the concurring justice was concurring simply 
because of that stipulation. In so stating, Justice Tuckebt 
stated: 
"Ordinarily, the plaintiff would be entitled to 
have the issue of malice as well as other fact 
questions determined by a jury. However, the 
record before us indicates that the plaintiff 
agreed in the district court to have the issues de-
termined by the court from the pleadings, depo-
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sitions and affidavits on file. The plaintiff hav-
ing agreed to that procedure he cannot claim 
on appeal that his right to a jury trial was de-
nied." 
The other two dissenting justices, Justice EUett and 
Justice Crockett, dissented from the main opinion and 
stated that the summary judgment should be reversed 
and the case remanded for trial. In so stating, Justice 
EUett stated: 
"The plaintiff alleged that Wilcox (the broad-
caster) failed to exercise due care in preventing 
the publication. 
'The defendants made a motion for summary 
judgment and filed an affidavit wherein they 
claimed there was no evidence of malice or failure 
to exercise due care to prevent the broadcast of 
the utterances complained of. 
"In considering a motion for summary judgment 
the court looks only to see if there are no genu-
ine issues of fact in dispute. It does not weigh 
the evidence or draw inferences therefrom." 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff respectfully submits that all of the evi-
dence before the court and the affidavits clearly show 
that the following issues of feet remain for adjudication 
by the trier of fact: 
1. Whether or not the plaintiff is a public per-
son and therefore subject to a claim of con-
ditional privilege. 
2. Whether or not the information broadcast 
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by the defendant was of the nature which 
would provide the defendant with qualified 
privilege. 
3. If the conditional privilege existed, whether 
or not plaintiff can prove actual malice or 
the lack of due care in the publicatibn and 
utterances of the statements complained of. 
4. Whether or not the statements complained 
of were true or untrue. 
5. If imtrue, whether or not the defendant 
knew or should have known that the state-
ments were false. 
6. Whether or not the statements made, if true 
to the extent of the statement, were not 
by withholding all of the information avail-
able to the defendant so as to more accu-
rately reflect the conclusions or findings of 
testing laboratories and government agen-
cies. 
Plaintiff submits that the summary judgment should 
be reversed and the case be remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KENNETH M. HISATAKE 
250 East 300 South 
Broadway Plaza, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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